Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Modal Logics and Philosophy' and 'Must We Believe in Set Theory?'

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30 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle]
There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle]
S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle]
Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle]
Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 5. Tableau Proof
If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]