17 ideas
| 16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
| 16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
| 11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
| 16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
| 4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
| 11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
| 16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
| 9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
| 4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
| 16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
| 11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
| 16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
| 11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
| 11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
| 11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
| 3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
| 3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |