Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'Analogy of Religion'

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16 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]