24 ideas
19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
10001 | An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber] |
10007 | Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber] |
10002 | '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber] |
9998 | What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber] |
10003 | Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber] |
10008 | Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber] |
10005 | Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber] |
10000 | We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber] |
10006 | First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber] |
7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
10004 | Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber] |
7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |