Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology', 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula' and 'Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8361 What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3158 Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
3159 Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8363 p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv]
8364 We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8366 The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv]
8362 We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8360 We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
8365 Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]