Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'The Ways of Paradox' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


18 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine]
Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]