14 ideas
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 20643 | Consilience is a common groundwork of explanation [Whewell] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
| 7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
| 7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |