19 ideas
| 20110 | Hegel, Fichte and Schelling wanted to know Kant's thing-in-itself, as ego, or nature, or spirit [Safranski] |
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
| 7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
| 7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
| 7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
| 7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
| 7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |