Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Kinds of Minds', 'There Are No Abstract Objects' and 'Plural Quantification Exposed'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
10779 A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10781 A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10783 Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo]
10778 Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
14596 Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
14597 Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
10782 The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
14598 Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
4608 Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4880 Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
4873 What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
4881 Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
4875 We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
4879 There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4876 Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4878 The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
4874 The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
4882 Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
4872 Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
4877 Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett]