18 ideas
19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
19137 | We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy] |
2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |