Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Against Coherence' and 'Notebooks 1914-1916'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
18274 Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
16908 We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18276 A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
6563 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
23472 The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
23500 My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
21515 Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
21514 Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21496 Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
21499 Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
21502 A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
21512 Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7658 Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
22323 The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
7655 The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7657 Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
7656 I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
7654 What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
23481 Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
4678 Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]