19 ideas
13856 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington] |
8948 | The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher] |
13767 | Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice] |
14277 | A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington] |
5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |
7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |