Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Daniel Dennett on himself', 'Principia Ethica' and 'Empty Names'

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24 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
18935 Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
18945 Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18934 Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
18938 Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
18947 Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
3986 The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3987 Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
3984 The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
3983 Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology
3985 Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett]