40 ideas
5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
5334 | We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan] |
5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
4880 | Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett] |
5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
4873 | What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett] |
13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
5353 | The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan] |
5354 | We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan] |
5349 | For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan] |
5338 | Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan] |
5344 | Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan] |
5332 | People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan] |
5345 | We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan] |
5343 | People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan] |
5347 | Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan] |
4875 | We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett] |
5339 | Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan] |
4879 | There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett] |
4876 | Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett] |
5342 | Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan] |
4878 | The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett] |
5335 | Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan] |
4874 | The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett] |
4882 | Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett] |
5348 | Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan] |
5355 | Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan] |
5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
4872 | Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett] |
13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |
4877 | Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett] |
5350 | The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan] |
5352 | The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan] |