Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Elbow Room: varieties of free will', 'Precepts for Advancing Science and Arts' and 'Approaches to Intentionality'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


17 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG]
Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett]
Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
All thinking has content [Lyons]