24 ideas
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |
17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |