12 ideas
| 10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
| 10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
| 10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
| 19566 | Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig] |
| 19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |
| 19567 | The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig] |
| 19570 | Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig] |
| 3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
| 3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
| 10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
| 10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
| 10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |