22 ideas
| 12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
| 2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
| 12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
| 12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
| 2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
| 2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
| 2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
| 12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
| 2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
| 2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
| 2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
| 18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
| 12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
| 12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
| 12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
| 12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
| 9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
| 2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |
| 9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
| 5467 | Euler said nature is instrinsically passive, and minds cause change [Euler, by Ellis] |