7 ideas
| 12251 | Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
| 3161 | If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett] |
| 2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
| 2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
| 3177 | You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett] |
| 16772 | An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau] |