12 ideas
6710 | You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James] |
22305 | If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James] |
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |