Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation', 'Euthydemus' and 'The Reasons of Love'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Jokes can sometimes be funny because they are offensive [Jacobson,D]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
We don't often respond to events in art as if they were real events [Jacobson,D]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Audiences can be too moral [Jacobson,D]
'Autonomism' says the morality is irrelevant to the aesthetics [Jacobson,D]
Moral defects of art can be among its aesthetic virtues [Jacobson,D]
Immoral art encourages immoral emotions [Jacobson,D]
Moderate moralism says moral qualities can sometimes also be aesthetic qualities [Jacobson,D]
We can judge art ethically, or rate its ethical influence, or assess its quality via its ethics [Jacobson,D]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]