Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation', 'Four Dimensionalism' and 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content'

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55 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Jokes can sometimes be funny because they are offensive [Jacobson,D]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider]
Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider]
4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider]
4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider]
Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider]
How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider]
Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
We don't often respond to events in art as if they were real events [Jacobson,D]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Audiences can be too moral [Jacobson,D]
'Autonomism' says the morality is irrelevant to the aesthetics [Jacobson,D]
Moral defects of art can be among its aesthetic virtues [Jacobson,D]
Immoral art encourages immoral emotions [Jacobson,D]
Moderate moralism says moral qualities can sometimes also be aesthetic qualities [Jacobson,D]
We can judge art ethically, or rate its ethical influence, or assess its quality via its ethics [Jacobson,D]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider]
Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider]
The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider]