Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Evidentialism', 'Discourse on Metaphysics' and 'The Coherence Theory of Truth'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
19342 Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
19079 For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19076 Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
19077 Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
19078 Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
19084 Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
19083 How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19075 Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
12711 The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
19349 The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
7558 Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
16761 Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
13088 Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
13085 Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
5024 Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19722 We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag]
19723 Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag]
19720 Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
19721 Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
5027 If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
5023 Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
2119 People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
5025 Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19074 Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
19082 Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
5026 Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz]