85 ideas
| 5278 | Philosophy is no more than abstractions concerning observations of human historical development [Marx/Engels] |
| 18137 | Impredicative definitions are wrong, because they change the set that is being defined? [Bostock] |
| 12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
| 12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
| 12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
| 18122 | Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock] |
| 18114 | There is no single agreed structure for set theory [Bostock] |
| 18107 | A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything [Bostock] |
| 18115 | We could add axioms to make sets either as small or as large as possible [Bostock] |
| 18139 | The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock] |
| 18105 | Replacement enforces a 'limitation of size' test for the existence of sets [Bostock] |
| 18109 | The completeness of first-order logic implies its compactness [Bostock] |
| 18108 | First-order logic is not decidable: there is no test of whether any formula is valid [Bostock] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 18123 | Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock] |
| 18120 | The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of natural deduction [Bostock] |
| 18125 | Berry's Paradox considers the meaning of 'The least number not named by this name' [Bostock] |
| 18100 | ω + 1 is a new ordinal, but its cardinality is unchanged [Bostock] |
| 18101 | Each addition changes the ordinality but not the cardinality, prior to aleph-1 [Bostock] |
| 18102 | A cardinal is the earliest ordinal that has that number of predecessors [Bostock] |
| 18106 | Aleph-1 is the first ordinal that exceeds aleph-0 [Bostock] |
| 18095 | Instead of by cuts or series convergence, real numbers could be defined by axioms [Bostock] |
| 18099 | The number of reals is the number of subsets of the natural numbers [Bostock] |
| 18093 | For Eudoxus cuts in rationals are unique, but not every cut makes a real number [Bostock] |
| 18110 | Infinitesimals are not actually contradictory, because they can be non-standard real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18156 | Modern axioms of geometry do not need the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18097 | The Peano Axioms describe a unique structure [Bostock] |
| 18149 | There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock] |
| 18148 | Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock] |
| 18145 | Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock] |
| 18143 | Frege makes numbers sets to solve the Caesar problem, but maybe Caesar is a set! [Bostock] |
| 18116 | Numbers can't be positions, if nothing decides what position a given number has [Bostock] |
| 18117 | Structuralism falsely assumes relations to other numbers are numbers' only properties [Bostock] |
| 18141 | Nominalism about mathematics is either reductionist, or fictionalist [Bostock] |
| 18157 | Nominalism as based on application of numbers is no good, because there are too many applications [Bostock] |
| 18150 | Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18158 | Ordinals are mainly used adjectively, as in 'the first', 'the second'... [Bostock] |
| 18127 | Simple type theory has 'levels', but ramified type theory has 'orders' [Bostock] |
| 18144 | Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock] |
| 18147 | Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock] |
| 18111 | Treating numbers as objects doesn't seem like logic, since arithmetic fixes their totality [Bostock] |
| 18129 | Many crucial logicist definitions are in fact impredicative [Bostock] |
| 18146 | If Hume's Principle is the whole story, that implies structuralism [Bostock] |
| 18159 | Higher cardinalities in sets are just fairy stories [Bostock] |
| 18155 | A fairy tale may give predictions, but only a true theory can give explanations [Bostock] |
| 18140 | The best version of conceptualism is predicativism [Bostock] |
| 18138 | Conceptualism fails to grasp mathematical properties, infinity, and objective truth values [Bostock] |
| 18133 | The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock] |
| 18131 | If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock] |
| 18134 | Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock] |
| 18135 | If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock] |
| 18136 | If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock] |
| 18132 | The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
| 5287 | Philosophical problems are resolved into empirical facts [Marx/Engels] |
| 12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
| 12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
| 12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
| 12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
| 12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
| 12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
| 23872 | 'Society determines consciousness' is contradictory; society only exists in minds [Weil on Marx/Engels] |
| 5277 | Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [Marx/Engels] |
| 5280 | Language co-exists with consciousness, and makes it social [Marx/Engels] |
| 18121 | In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock] |
| 5281 | Consciousness is a social product [Marx/Engels] |
| 5276 | The nature of an individual coincides with what they produce and how they produce it [Marx/Engels] |
| 5289 | When aristocracy or the bourgeoisie dominate, certain values dominate with them [Marx/Engels] |
| 5274 | Young Hegelians proposed changing our present consciousness for liberating critical consciousness [Marx/Engels] |
| 21992 | Producing their own subsistence distinguishes men from animals [Marx/Engels] |
| 5275 | Men distinguish themselves from animals when they begin to produce their means of subsistence [Marx/Engels] |
| 5292 | Individuals are mutually hostile unless they group together in competition with other groups [Marx/Engels] |
| 5293 | Only in community are people able to cultivate their gifts, and therefore be free [Marx/Engels] |
| 5273 | Young Hegelians think consciousness is chains for men, where old Hegelians think it the bond of society [Marx/Engels] |
| 5282 | If the common interest imposes on the individual, his actions become alienated and enslaving [Marx/Engels] |
| 5283 | In communist society we are not trapped in one activity, but can act freely [Marx/Engels] |
| 5288 | The class controlling material production also controls mental production [Marx/Engels] |
| 5290 | The revolutionary class is opposed to 'class', and represents all of society [Marx/Engels] |
| 5294 | To assert themselves as individuals, the proletarians must overthrow the State [Marx/Engels] |
| 5285 | Slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine [Marx/Engels] |
| 5284 | Communism abolishes private property and dissolves the powerful world market [Marx/Engels] |
| 5291 | The law says private property is the result of the general will [Marx/Engels] |
| 5279 | Human history must always be studied in relation to industry and exchange [Marx/Engels] |
| 5286 | Most historians are trapped in the illusions of their own epoch [Marx/Engels] |
| 12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |