17 ideas
| 8717 | Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend] |
| 10113 | The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert] |
| 10115 | Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| 10116 | Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| 15148 | Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty] |
| 15145 | A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty] |
| 15147 | Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty] |
| 9169 | A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam] |
| 5819 | Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam] |
| 15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
| 9168 | I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam] |
| 5820 | 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam] |
| 9170 | We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam] |
| 5817 | Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam] |
| 15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
| 15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |
| 5818 | If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam] |