Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology' and 'The Internalist Conception of Justification'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert]
Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]