9 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
8717 | Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend] |
10113 | The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert] |
10115 | Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
10116 | Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |