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All the ideas for 'Treatise of Human Nature', 'Phenomenalism' and 'The Philosopher's Toolkit'

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80 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl]
In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume]
There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume]
The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine]
If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume]
Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume]
Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume]
If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume]
Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume]
Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking]
The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl]
To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume]
A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume]
The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume]
Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume]
A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume]
We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume]
Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume]
Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume]
When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume]
We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume]
Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C]
The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume]
You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume]