17 ideas
15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
21097 | Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume] |