122 ideas
13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
2196 | The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy [Hume] |
2187 | If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume] |
2200 | All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past [Hume] |
13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
4636 | All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) [Hume] |
9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
2197 | Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application [Hume] |
13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
18201 | General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C] |
13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
7700 | We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume] |
13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
13602 | We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume] |
9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
2216 | We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume] |
2215 | There is no such thing as chance [Hume] |
2209 | Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume] |
2208 | Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume] |
2207 | Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume] |
2213 | Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation [Hume] |
3661 | 'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
2191 | Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume] |
2239 | If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume] |
2237 | It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume] |
23631 | Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume] |
2192 | All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume] |
2246 | If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume] |
2190 | All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume] |
2184 | All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume] |
2182 | Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume] |
2189 | All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect [Hume] |
2702 | Only madmen dispute the authority of experience [Hume] |
2183 | We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences [Hume] |
2194 | How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? [Hume] |
2186 | We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced [Hume] |
2205 | You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience [Hume] |
2217 | When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise [Hume] |
3902 | Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton on Hume] |
23421 | If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in [Hume] |
2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
2235 | There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume] |
10328 | We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection [Hume] |
2230 | Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [Hume, by PG] |
2238 | Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects [Hume] |
2242 | Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty [Hume] |
2243 | Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding [Hume] |
2236 | Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason [Hume] |
2240 | It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument [Hume] |
2241 | The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it [Hume] |
2198 | We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread [Hume] |
2204 | All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume] |
2199 | Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume] |
2201 | Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume] |
2203 | If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume] |
2202 | Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume] |
3598 | Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume] |
6350 | Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume] |
2210 | A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume] |
17712 | General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume] |
8544 | Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
2211 | When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly [Hume] |
2214 | Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume] |
2212 | An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume] |
2222 | The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume] |
2223 | Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume] |
3655 | Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume] |
13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
2220 | Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume] |
2224 | Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition [Hume] |
2225 | If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime [Hume] |
2226 | Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind [Hume] |
2233 | No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy [Hume] |
2195 | We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes [Hume] |
2245 | A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect [Hume] |
4772 | If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved [Hume] |
8341 | Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
8344 | At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson] |
2234 | It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other [Hume] |
3662 | Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
4771 | In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos on Hume] |
5194 | Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer on Hume] |
2221 | A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience [Hume] |
2193 | No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions [Hume] |
8422 | Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume] |
2218 | In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume] |
15249 | Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume] |
8339 | Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
2244 | It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist [Hume] |
2232 | You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect [Hume] |
2229 | To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event [Hume] |
2227 | A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume] |
2228 | All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' [Hume] |
2185 | The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds [Hume] |