37 ideas
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE] |
4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE] |
4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE] |
4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE] |
4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE] |
4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE] |
4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE] |
4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE] |
4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE] |
4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE] |
4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
21097 | Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume] |