10 ideas
16129 | Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe] |
16459 | Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans] |
16460 | Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis] |
16457 | There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis] |
14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
7752 | Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice] |
7751 | Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice] |
7753 | We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice] |
21097 | Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume] |