Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals', 'Philosophical Logic' and 'Intellectual Autobiography'

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50 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess]
It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess]
The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess]
Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess]
We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess]
We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess]
We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess]
Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess]
It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice only exists to support society [Hume]
If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume]
Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume]