11 ideas
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 8724 | The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger] |
| 8722 | No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger] |
| 8723 | An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 21093 | Friendship without community spirit misses out on the main part of virtue [Hume] |
| 21091 | It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume] |
| 21092 | Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume] |