42 ideas
15879 | The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré] |
15891 | Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré] |
15878 | Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré] |
15874 | Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré] |
15884 | Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré] |
15880 | In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré] |
15869 | Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré] |
15881 | We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré] |
15882 | Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré] |
15888 | The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré] |
15887 | 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré] |
15889 | It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré] |
15890 | Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré] |
15885 | The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré] |
15868 | Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré] |
21059 | General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant] |
21061 | Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant] |
21060 | It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant] |
21062 | The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant] |
21071 | There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant] |
21063 | Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant] |
21068 | There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant] |
21069 | A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant] |
21070 | A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant] |
21067 | A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant] |
21097 | Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume] |
21064 | A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant] |
21066 | Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant] |
21065 | You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant] |
21072 | The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant] |
15886 | Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré] |
15864 | Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré] |
15865 | Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré] |
15862 | Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré] |
15870 | Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré] |
15871 | Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré] |
15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
15860 | We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré] |
15872 | Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré] |
15867 | Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré] |
15892 | Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré] |
15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |