Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letter to Hutcheson 1740', 'The Need for Roots' and 'Eudemian Ethics'

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65 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle]
Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle]
The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle]
Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle]
Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle]
We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle]
Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil]
Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Education is essentially motivation [Weil]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil]