Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'That Politics may be reduced to a Science', 'The Philosophy of Philosophy' and 'Begriffsschrift'

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Frege changed philosophy by extending logic's ability to check the grounds of thinking [Potter on Frege]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
We should not describe human laws of thought, but how to correctly track truth [Frege, by Fisher]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
I don't use 'subject' and 'predicate' in my way of representing a judgement [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
For Frege, 'All A's are B's' means that the concept A implies the concept B [Frege, by Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Frege has a judgement stroke (vertical, asserting or judging) and a content stroke (horizontal, expressing) [Frege, by Weiner]
The laws of logic are boundless, so we want the few whose power contains the others [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
In 1879 Frege developed second order logic [Frege, by Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Frege replaced Aristotle's subject/predicate form with function/argument form [Frege, by Weiner]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
A quantifier is a second-level predicate (which explains how it contributes to truth-conditions) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
For Frege the variable ranges over all objects [Frege, by Tait]
Frege's domain for variables is all objects, but modern interpretations first fix the domain [Dummett on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Frege introduced quantifiers for generality [Frege, by Weiner]
Frege reduced most quantifiers to 'everything' combined with 'not' [Frege, by McCullogh]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
Proof theory began with Frege's definition of derivability [Frege, by Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
Frege produced axioms for logic, though that does not now seem the natural basis for logic [Frege, by Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
It may be possible to define induction in terms of the ancestral relation [Frege, by Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Frege's logic has a hierarchy of object, property, property-of-property etc. [Frege, by Smith,P]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship without community spirit misses out on the main part of virtue [Hume]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier [Frege, by Weiner]