100 ideas
17240 | Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes] |
17237 | Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes] |
17239 | Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes] |
17241 | A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes] |
17242 | 'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes] |
17245 | A part of a part is a part of a whole [Hobbes] |
17258 | If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to [Hobbes] |
17253 | Change is nothing but movement [Hobbes] |
2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
16670 | Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes] |
16621 | Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes] |
16734 | The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes] |
17247 | The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes] |
14960 | Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes] |
17250 | If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes] |
17249 | If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes] |
17248 | If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes] |
16790 | A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes] |
17244 | To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes] |
17233 | Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes] |
17246 | Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes] |
17251 | The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes] |
17257 | It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes] |
12853 | Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes] |
17256 | If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes] |
16794 | As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes] |
17255 | Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes] |
16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
16582 | We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes] |
2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
22167 | Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas] |
2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
22117 | Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews] |
17238 | Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes] |
2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
17260 | Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes] |
19373 | A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R] |
2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
2948 | Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes] |
2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
17261 | Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion [Hobbes] |
18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
17236 | Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes] |
14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
22118 | Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews] |
4348 | Love, and do what you will [Augustine] |
7821 | Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling] |
22119 | Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews] |
16600 | Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential [Hobbes] |
17252 | Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it [Hobbes] |
17254 | An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes] |
17235 | A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes] |
17234 | Motion is losing one place and acquiring another [Hobbes] |
17259 | 'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something [Hobbes] |
17243 | Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories [Hobbes] |
16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |
22116 | Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews] |
19338 | Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins] |