Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Demonstratives', 'On the Notion of Cause' and 'W.V. Quine'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
8378 Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
8472 Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
8476 Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
8480 S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
8474 Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
8465 Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
8452 Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
8475 The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
8454 The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8473 The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
8458 Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
8375 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
8457 The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
8477 People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
8471 Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14894 Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
14700 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
8484 If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
4396 The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell]
8376 If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8380 Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
8379 In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
8381 The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell]