Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Demonstratives', 'What is a Law of Nature?' and 'Discourse on the Origin of Inequality'

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80 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong]
Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis]
Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong]
Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau]
Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau]
Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau]
I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau]
Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau]
Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau]
Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau]
Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau]
Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / b. Natural equality
In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau]
It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau]
If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau]
People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau]
What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau]
Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau]
If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong]
Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis]
A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong]
Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong]
Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau]