18 ideas
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen] |
9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson] |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macią/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |