11 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 12354 | A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin] |
| 12358 | Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin] |
| 12346 | Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |