44 ideas
22285 | Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter] |
22301 | The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter] |
22324 | It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter] |
22279 | Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter] |
22291 | Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter] |
22295 | Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter] |
22310 | The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter] |
22298 | Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter] |
12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
22287 | If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter] |
13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
22284 | 'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter] |
13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
22281 | A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter] |
19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
22327 | Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter] |
13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
22273 | Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter] |
11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
22290 | The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter] |
13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
22283 | Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter] |
22282 | 'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter] |
22296 | Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter] |
13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |