12 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |