66 ideas
21422 | Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant] |
21408 | For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant] |
21416 | Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant] |
3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley] |
3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley] |
3959 | There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley] |
3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley] |
21410 | That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant] |
3958 | Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley] |
3943 | If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley] |
3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer] |
5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley] |
1103 | 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley] |
6403 | For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling] |
3936 | Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley] |
3930 | There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley] |
3939 | I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley] |
3945 | There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley] |
3947 | Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley] |
3933 | Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley] |
3934 | A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley] |
3935 | The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley] |
3937 | 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley] |
3940 | Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley] |
3957 | Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley] |
3953 | Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley] |
3938 | Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley] |
3944 | It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley] |
3932 | A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley] |
3948 | Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley] |
21421 | Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant] |
3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
5374 | Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley] |
14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
3954 | Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley] |
21415 | Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant] |
21409 | Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant] |
21431 | The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant] |
21437 | All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant] |
21429 | The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant] |
21411 | A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant] |
21413 | Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant] |
21414 | The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant] |
21436 | We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant] |
21419 | If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant] |
21417 | How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant] |
21420 | If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant] |
21418 | There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant] |
21425 | We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant] |
21428 | Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant] |
21426 | Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant] |
21427 | Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant] |
21430 | Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant] |
21434 | We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant] |
21412 | Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant] |
21435 | Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant] |
21433 | Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant] |
21423 | Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant] |
21424 | Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant] |
3950 | There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley] |
3951 | There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley] |
3949 | It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley] |
3956 | People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley] |
3955 | If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley] |