27 ideas
13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |