54 ideas
4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |
7337 | In Mosaic legal theory, crimes are sins and sins are crimes [Johnson,P] |
7339 | Because human life is what is sacred, Mosaic law has no death penalty for property violations [Johnson,P] |
7353 | The Pharisees undermined slavery, by giving slaves responsibility and status in law courts [Johnson,P] |
7340 | Mosaic law was the first to embody the rule of law, and equality before the law [Johnson,P] |
7338 | Man's life is sacred, because it is made in God's image [Johnson,P] |
7348 | The Jews sharply distinguish human and divine, but the Greeks pull them closer together [Johnson,P] |
7336 | A key moment is the idea of a single moral God, who imposes his morality on humanity [Johnson,P] |
7341 | Sampson illustrates the idea that religious heroes often begin as outlaws and semi-criminals [Johnson,P] |
7342 | Isaiah moved Israelite religion away from the local, onto a more universal plane [Johnson,P] |
7355 | The Torah pre-existed creation, and was its blueprint [Johnson,P] |
7344 | Judaism involves circumcision, Sabbath, Passover, Pentecost, Tabernacles, New Year, and Atonement [Johnson,P] |
7345 | In exile the Jews became a nomocracy [Johnson,P] |
7347 | Zoroastrians believed in one eternal beneficent being, Creator through the holy spirit [Johnson,P] |
7349 | Immortality based on judgement of merit was developed by the Egyptians (not the Jews) [Johnson,P] |
7354 | The main doctrine of the Pharisees was belief in resurrection and the afterlife [Johnson,P] |
7356 | Pious Jews saw heaven as a vast library [Johnson,P] |