8 ideas
14231 | We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins] |
14232 | We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins] |
14233 | Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins] |
7876 | Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau] |
7877 | Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau] |
7878 | Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine] |
14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |