12 ideas
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 21386 | We should accept as explanations all the plausible ways in which something could come about [Epicurus] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
| 14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
| 14051 | A cosmos is a collection of stars and an earth, with some sort of boundary, movement and shape [Epicurus] |
| 1828 | God does not intervene in heavenly movements, but is beyond all action and perfectly happy [Epicurus] |