Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'The Impossibility of Superdupervenience' and 'Anselm and Actuality'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

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6 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic

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For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker]

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality

16062

A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience

16061

If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism

16060

Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]

16064

The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

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Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]