66 ideas
18290 | But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche] |
18303 | Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche] |
18305 | To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche] |
10987 | Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read] |
11004 | Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read] |
11018 | There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read] |
11011 | Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read] |
11020 | Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read] |
10986 | Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read] |
10972 | The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read] |
11024 | Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read] |
10985 | We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read] |
10970 | A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read] |
10984 | Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read] |
10973 | A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read] |
11007 | Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read] |
10978 | In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read] |
10971 | A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read] |
10988 | Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read] |
10974 | Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read] |
10975 | Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read] |
10977 | Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read] |
10976 | Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read] |
11014 | Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read] |
11025 | Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read] |
10979 | Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read] |
10980 | Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read] |
10997 | Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read] |
11016 | Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read] |
11019 | Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read] |
11012 | A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read] |
11013 | Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read] |
10995 | A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read] |
11001 | Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read] |
10992 | The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read] |
10989 | The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read] |
11017 | Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read] |
10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
11000 | If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read] |
10998 | The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read] |
20757 | The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche] |
18289 | Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche] |
14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
11005 | Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read] |
10966 | A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read] |
18299 | The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche] |
18297 | We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche] |
18293 | The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche] |
18301 | We only really love children and work [Nietzsche] |
18307 | I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche] |
18291 | Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche] |
18287 | People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche] |
18295 | If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche] |
18286 | The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche] |
18296 | An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche] |
18294 | The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche] |
18304 | Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche] |
18300 | Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche] |
18302 | Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche] |
18292 | I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche] |
18298 | Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods! [Nietzsche] |
18288 | Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche] |
18306 | We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche] |